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Human cognition has usually been approached on the level of individual minds
and brains, but social interaction is a challenging case. Is it best thought of as a
self-contained individual cognitive process aiming at an “understanding of the other,”
or should it rather be approached as an collective, inter -personal process where
individual cognitive components interact on a moment-to-moment basis to form coupled
dynamics? In a combined fMRI and eye-tracking study we directly contrasted these
models of social cognition. We found that the perception of situations affording social
contingent responsiveness (e.g., someone offering or showing you an object) elicited
activations in regions of the right posterior temporal sulcus and yielded greater pupil
dilation corresponding to a model of coupled dynamics (joint action). In contrast,
the social-cognitive perception of someone “privately” manipulating an object elicited
activation in medial prefrontal cortex, the right inferior frontal gyrus and right inferior
parietal lobus, regions normally associated with Theory of Mind and with the mirror neuron
system. Our findings support a distinction in social cognition between social observation
and social interaction, and demonstrate that simple ostensive cues may shift participants’
experience, behavior, and brain activity between these modes. The identification of
a distinct, interactive mode has implications for research on social cognition, both in
everyday life and in clinical conditions.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in evolutionary anthropology and experimental
psychology suggest that one of the keys to the unique evolu-
tionary trajectory of the human species can be found in our
advanced capacities for reciprocal social interaction (Donald,
1991, 2001; Tomasello, 1999, 2008; Tomasello et al., 2005; Csibra
and Gergely, 2009, 2011). This inevitably leads to fundamen-
tal questions concerning the neurocognitive foundations of such
social capacities. During the last couple of decades, an increasing
number of studies have addressed the human brain mechanisms
responsible for our ability to make sense of social phenom-
ena. A number of brain networks—often referred to as “the
social brain”—are found to be associated with various aspects of
social cognition. For instance, themedial prefrontal and temporo-
parietal cortices consistently activate in tasks involving Theory
of Mind/mentalizing (e.g., Castelli et al., 2000; Gallagher et al.,
2000; German et al., 2004; Walter et al., 2004), while premo-
tor areas and inferior parietal cortices seem to be involved in
mental mirroring of others’ motor actions (e.g., Arbib et al.,
2000; Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Stamenov and Gallese, 2002; Heiser
et al., 2003; Kaplan and Iacoboni, 2006; Ocampo et al., 2011).
While these studies make up an intriguing body of research on
the neurobiological foundations of what we might term “social
observation” (where no contingent response is afforded), it is dis-
putable to which degree the findings can be generalized to account
for processes underlying social interaction. We argue that the dis-
tinction between 3rd person social observation and 2nd person
social interaction is an important conceptual and empirical dis-
tinction that has been somewhat neglected in the neurocognitive
field (Roepstorff, 2001; Tylén and Allen, 2009; Schilbach, 2010;
Hasson et al., 2012).
Two prevalent conceptual frameworks have oriented the
majority of studies in social neurocognition, Theory of
Mind/mentalizing (hence ToM) and Simulation Theory (which
is often closely associated with the Mirror-System hypothesis—
hence MNS). In both cases, the overall goal is to unravel and
map the neurobiological mechanisms responsible for the abil-
ity to attribute, understand, and empathize mental states of
others. Although we recognize that the underlying assumptions
and proposed mechanisms of ToM and MNS are indeed very
different, they take the same point of departure: the individ-
ual mind. ToM and MNS models are thus mainly preoccu-
pied with the way individuals make sense of each other from
an observational point of view (Gallagher and Hutto, 2008).
The fundamental processes of social cognition are described
in terms of mental inference (ToM) or embodied simulation
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(MNS) facilitating a “self-contained understanding” of other per-
sons’ actions. This “understanding” in turn supposedly makes
it possible to choose appropriate responses, and for instance
engage in interactions (Frith and Frith, 2001, 2006a; Schulte-
Ruther et al., 2007). In other words, individual observational
processes are—more or less explicitly—given primacy as consti-
tuting the core of social cognition, while other social cognitive
phenomena (e.g., social interaction) are derived from or emergent
upon these fundamental processes. Hence in these frameworks,
mechanisms in social interaction are extrapolated from studies
of social observation and thus explained on the level of indi-
vidual minds and brains. An interaction thus involves two or
more individuals that recursively observe, represent and react
to each other’s actions based on their individual internal rep-
resentational models. This has important implications for the
theoretical and experimental foci of the two paradigms. Here,
we will make the case that social observation and social interac-
tion are in fact very different phenomena.While an individualistic
and observational stance to social cognition may be appropriate
for the study of a range of phenomena including the detec-
tion of deception, pretense, emotional expressions, etc., it is
much less clear to which extent it can tackle questions related
to the inherently collective and reciprocal dynamics of social
interaction.
A growing literature within philosophy of mind and cognitive
science is advancing the view that in order to adequately account
for cognitive processes involved in social interaction, we need to
widen the perspective beyond individual minds and brains. These
approaches are largely informed by recent discussions under the
headline of “extended,” “enacted,” and “distributed” cognition
often relying on insights from complex systems theory. The main
argument is that when two persons engage in joint activities their
bodies, actions, and individual cognitive processes become cou-
pled in dynamic ways. Hence rather than working in parallel
as self-enclosed autonomous entities, persons involved in direct
interaction get intermingled in complementary ways that enable
emergent synergies (De Jaegher et al., 2010; Hasson et al., 2012).
In this understanding, a sequence of joint action is better con-
ceived of as a whole (singular, continuous) time series, rather
than a synchronization of two independent processes (Black et al.,
2007; Konvalinka et al., 2010; Riley et al., 2011). As an example,
consider a dialogue. In conversation, interlocutors take turns in
a complementary way making up the overall object of the dia-
log. One interlocutor’s speech turn—for example, a question—is
only completed by the responding speech turn of the other
(cf. the concept of “adjacency pairs,” Goodwin and Heritage,
1990). If we isolate an individual component, say all the speech
turns of one interlocutor, we are left with a partial object that
does not make any sense on its own. In other words, the dia-
log as a phenomenon cannot be reduced to any of the partial
individual components, but can only be appropriately assessed at
the collective, inter-personal level (Kello et al., 2010). We argue
that turn-taking-like responsiveness is a fundamental character-
istic of social interaction across a broad range of contexts from
diaper-changing to tango-dancing. As a distinct phenomenon, it
should not be confused with automatic mirroring or simulation.
Where mirroring is assumed to be an internal representational
event, turn-taking responsiveness is rather characterized by its
complementary contribution to the intersubjective scene. The
ostensive act of one person (e.g., a greeting nod or an eyebrow
flash) afford for the complementary response from the recipient
(e.g., an “answering” nodding gesture). An offering hand gesture
affords a receptive one (Newman-Norlund et al., 2007; Ferri et al.,
2011; Sartori et al., 2012).
Which predictions follow from the conceptual approach to
social interaction sketched above? If key dynamics of social inter-
action can only be found at a collective, level, how can we then
study its neurocognitive underpinnings? One suggestion is that
simultaneous recording frommultiple agents is necessary to make
claims about the dynamics of mutually coupled cognitive sys-
tems. While this may be a useful approach (see Konvalinka and
Roepstorff, 2012) we here argue that recognizing the coordina-
tive nature of social interaction allows specific predictions, even
on the level of individual brains recorded in isolation. If the brain
in joint action becomes a component-node in a larger interactive
array, we can reframe the basic question as: What does it take for a
brain to successfully engage in reciprocal coupling processes with
other responsive components?
For a component to successfully work in tight concert with
other external components it has to continuously integrate, adapt
and respond to incoming stimuli at a multiplicity of temporal lev-
els and modalities (Konvalinka et al., 2010). This suggests that
rapid adaptation and coordination are crucial factors in real-time
interaction. These properties are fundamentally different from
those involved in “social observation.” Where an observational
understanding of a social phenomenon may be internally realized
in terms of simulation or inference, a socially interactive prac-
tice calls for moment-to-moment reciprocity with one or more
co-operative partners in the “external” social environment.
These fundamental differences between social observation and
social interaction predict the involvement of distinct anatom-
ical structures in the two processes. Regions of the temporal
lopes (in particular STS, pSTS) have been consistently associ-
ated with the fine-grained continuous temporal integration of
dynamic stimuli (Hasson et al., 2008; Stephens et al., 2010;
Lerner et al., 2011). These structures, particularly in the right
hemisphere, have indeed been found in a number of recent stud-
ies addressing the neurocognitive underpinnings of joint action
and joint attention. In a fMRI study conducted by Newman-
Norlund et al. (2008), activity was enhanced in right pSTS
when participants performed a joint task with another person
in the control room affording complementary (non-isomorphic)
actions. In a study by Redcay et al. (2010), participants under-
went fMRI scanning while solving a cooperative joint attention
task with another person through a bidirectional video link.
Again the main findings related to right pSTS/TPJ. Likewise,
a fMRI study applying a dual player virtual communication
game (Noordzij et al., 2009) also found the right pSTS to be
modulated by social interaction in contrast to solo conditions,
and finally a study by Iacoboni et al. (2001) found that the
right pSTS was more active when participants imitated displayed
hand movement than when they produced them from mem-
ory. We notice that the rpSTS has both been argued to belong
to the ToM network (Frith and Frith, 2006b) and to the MNS
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 331 | 2
Tylén et al. Social interaction vs. social observation
(Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009). However, while pSTS may
co-activate with both of these networks in task specific ways,
no consistent pattern has so far been established, and no stable
connectivity has been established between the pSTS and regions
associated with ToM and MNS (Ethofer et al., 2011). We thus
argue that pSTS is not a constitutive part of the ToM or the MNS
network.
The findings cited above indicate the right pSTS as an area
particularly sensitive to the continuous fine-grained temporal
navigation and integration of stimuli necessary for immediate
contingent responsiveness in social interaction. Thereby, it seems
a good anatomical candidate for our hypothesized distinctive
mode of social engagement. We thus predict that social interac-
tion will recruit the pSTS, while social observation primarily will
rely on networks related to ToM and MNS. How can we test such
hypotheses?
This requires an experimental paradigm that directly com-
pares interactive and observational social cognition. Here, we
report an fMRI experiment that contrasts video stimuli, which
either evoked an observational or interactive responsive attitude
in the participant toward an actor performing simple object-
related gestures. This contrast was established by modulating
the ostensive character of the performed action. In the interac-
tive conditions, the actor made interaction initiation cues (eye
contact, eyebrow flashes and nods) before performing a placing-
object-for or showing-object-to action (Clark, 2005). In contrast,
in the non-interactive “private” condition the same actions were
performed without ostensive cues. Moreover, the directionality of
the action was modulated so that in some conditions the actor
would face the participant while in others she/he was presented
from a slightly averted perspective as if facing someone outside
the perspective of the camera.
The theoretical analysis above generated specific anatomical
hypotheses relating to three clusters of brain areas associated
with ToM (in particular MPFC and TPJ), the MNS (pre-Motor,
IPL), and Joint Action/Joint Attention (pSTS). We thus restricted
the study to target these particular areas using a ROI approach
(see section “Materials and Methods” for details). We predicted
that ostensive object-gestures would engage contingent respon-
siveness in the participants, and that this would elicit differential
activation in pSTS. In contrast, observing “private” object manip-
ulations would evoke an observational attitude in the participant
and hence elicit activations in ToM and MNS regions. Beside,
we hypothesized that activity in these areas would be modulated
by the directionality of action, as either participant-directed or
other-directed.
Since the pSTS has also been associated with perspective
taking, eye-gaze and saccading behaviors (Allison et al., 2000),
we included simultaneous in-scanner-eye-tracking to control
for effects caused by participants’ simple eye gaze-behaviors.
Furthermore, we used pupillometrics (pupil size measurements)
to assess pupil dilation and constrictions in response to the
experimental conditions (Kampe et al., 2003; Granholm and
Steinhauer, 2004). We predicted that interactively engaging stim-
uli would be more emotionally arousing resulting in greater pupil
dilation than stimuli affording a more observational attitude in
the participant.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
Twenty-two healthy, right-handed adult volunteers (12
females/10 males, mean age 25 ± 4.8 STD) who had all given
their written consent in correspondence with the requirements
of the local ethical committee participated in the experiment.
The participants were mainly recruited among students at
Aarhus University, and were naïve with respect to the purpose of
the study.
STIMULI AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Stimuli consisted of 32 video clips of 5 s duration, showing
an actor sitting at a table in front of an object (see Figure 1).
The videos differed on three variables: (1) actor gender (m/f),
(2) object (cup or fruit) and—for the action condition—
(3) action type (placing-object-for or showing-object-to)
(cf. Clark, 2005). The experiment was divided into two
sessions of 64 trials (i.e., all videos were shown four times).
We used two-by-two-by-two factorial design (making up in all
eight conditions) with themain factors Ostention (ostensive/non-
ostensive), Direction (direct/diverted perspective), and Action
(action/no action). In ostensive conditions, the actor would look
up and make an interaction-initiating cue by establishing eye
contact (either to the participant or to an inferred other out-
side the scope of the camera) and making an eyebrow lift and a
nod before performing one of the two object directed gestures.
In non-ostensive conditions the action was performed “privately”
without any addressing cues or eye contact. In direct conditions,
the ostensive cues and gestures were performed directly to the
A B
C D
FIGURE 1 | Example of stimuli. In 5 s video clips, an actor performed
simple object gestures (“placing an object for” or “showing an object to”
someone) in four conditions: (A) ostensive and direct, (B) non-ostensive
and direct, (C) ostensive and averted, (D) non-ostensive and averted.
Besides, all four conditions were replicated without the object gesture.
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participant (i.e., the camera), while in the diverted condition the
actor was oriented at approx. 20◦ of the camera in the direction
of an inferred other (see Figure 1). In the no action conditions,
the four conditions above were replicated, but without the object
gesture.
The stimulus videos were presented in blocks of two clips
from the same condition, and the order of blocks was random-
ized between participants. After the two clips participants were
asked one of two yes/no questions: “was it the same person” or
“was it the same object?” This probed whether the same or dif-
ferent actors or objects had appeared in the two movie clips.
The questions were randomized so that the participant could
not anticipate if she/he would be asked about the actor or the
object. In order to solve the task, the participant thus had to
pay close attention to both actors and objects during the stim-
ulus presentation. Participants would respond by pressing one of
two buttons with their right hand index and middle finger. The
left/right position of the affirmative response was randomized
across trials.
SCANNING PARAMETERS
We used a 3T General Electrics MR system (Waukesha, WI, USA)
with an eight channel head coil to acquire the T2 -weighted
gradient, echo-planar images (EPI) with Blood Oxygenation
Level-Dependent (BOLD) contrast using the following parame-
ters: echo time (TE): 30ms, repetition time (TR): 3000ms, and
a flip angle of 90◦. Whole-brain images were obtained over 39
sequential, interleaved 3.5mm axial slices with a 128 × 128 pixel
resolution matrix and a field of view of 240 × 240mm.
EYE-TRACKING PARAMETERS
Participants’ eye movements and pupil size were recorded simul-
taneously with the MR acquisition using a SMI/Avotec IViewX
eye-tracking system in a Silent Vision 7021 MR-insert binocu-
lar visual system. Data were recorded from the right eye with a
sample frequency of 50Hz. Prior to each of the two scanning
sessions, the eye-tracker was calibrated using the IViewX nine-
point automated calibration procedure, which was repeated until
the calibration was satisfactory. The eye-tracker was linked and
synchronized with the MR stimulus computer and continuously
recorded time stamps for the initiation of stimulus videos.
ADDITIONAL BEHAVIORAL TESTING
After the fMRI scanning, participants went through an exten-
sive debriefing where they evaluated their experience on various
parameters. Moreover, participants watched the stimulus videos
again on a computer screen and rated how “socially engaging”
they found them on a 5 point scale where 1 = not engaging, and
5 = very socially engaging.
ANALYSIS
BEHAVIORAL ANALYSES
Task performance (response accuracy) from the in-scanner task
was summarized and averaged for each participant and tested
against chance performance using paired t-tests. Likewise, the
post-scanning ratings of the socially engaging nature of the
stimuli were summarized and averaged for each participant and
each condition, and condition-related differences were tested
using a within-subject, repeated measures, three-way analysis
of variance (Howell, 2002), with the factors Ostension (+/−),
Direction (direct/diverted), and Action (+/−). The analysis was
thresholded at p < 0.05. Due to technical problems, we failed to
obtain rating data from two participants, so only data from the
remaining twenty participants entered this analysis. All statistical
tests were performed in MATLAB 2011b.
EYE-TRACKING ANALYSIS
Since the experiment was mainly optimized for fMRI acquisition,
only full eye-tracking data sets from eleven participants entered
the analysis. The remaining data were lost or corrupted due to
technical problems and calibration difficulties. Task related eye-
tracking data (x/y coordinates and x/y pupil diameter in pixels
at a 50Hz sampling for each 5 s stimulus video) were prepro-
cessed by removing eye blinks and outliers (deviating in distance
with more that 3 × SD of the mean). The data were high-pass fil-
tered at a 100 s cut off to counter calibration drift. Saccade velocity
was then calculated for each participant based on point-to-point
Euclidean distance (Salvucci andGoldberg, 2000). Similarly, pupil
diameter was calculated as an average of the pupil x and y diam-
eter direction (although these were strongly correlated we used
this procedure to get a more stable index of pupil size). Velocity
and pupil size data were averaged for each stimulus trial before
entering further analysis.
The preprocessed data were used in two ways: first, to test
for condition related differences in participants’ gaze behaviors
(hence the “stand-alone eye-tracking analysis”). For this purpose
eye-movement velocity and pupil size data from each condition
entered a within-subject, repeated measures, three-way analysis
of variance (Howell, 2002), with the factors Ostension (+/−),
Direction (direct/diverted), and Action (+/−). The analysis was
thresholded at p < 0.05. Second, for each participant, velocity
data were averaged for each stimulus event to be included as a
first-level parametric modulation in the fMRI analysis (hence “the
combined eye-tracking/fMRI analysis”).
fMRI ANALYSIS
All fMRI data analysis was conducted using SPM8 (Statistical
Parametric Mapping, Wellcome Department of Imaging
Neuroscience, London) implemented in MATLAB 2011b
(Mathworks Inc. Sherborn, MA) using default settings unless
otherwise specified. Images were spatially realigned, normalized
to the MNI template and smoothed with an isotropic 8mm
FWHM Gaussian kernel.
Statistical analysis was conducted following a two-level gen-
eral linear model approach (Penny and Holmes, 2007). On the
first-level, task related BOLD responses were modeled for each
subject by convolving condition onsets and durations with the
standard hemodynamic response function and contrasting fac-
torial main and interaction effects. Two independent first-level
analyses were carried out. The first, which was carried out for
all participants, included a regressor (parametric modulation) for
each of the variables of the stimulus videos (gender, object and
action type) as well as the six standard SPM8 motion parame-
ters. The second first-level analysis was only carried out on data
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from the 11 participants fromwho we recorded a full eye-tracking
data set. In addition to the stimulus andmotion regressors used in
the analysis above, this analysis included a parametric modulation
regressing out relative differences in participants’ eye-movements
(saccade activity). For both first-level analyses, images were high-
pass filtered at a 128 s cut off.
Second level RFX analyses
Two group RFX analyses were conducted—one for each of
the first-level analyses—using a Three-Way repeated measures
whole brain ANOVA (corrected for non-sphericity) in SPM8.
The directionality of effects was explored using one-sample t-
tests. In both cases, individual subject effects were modeled
using the covariate function to adjust the statistics and degrees
of freedom during inference. We did not assume independence
or equal variance (Christensen and Wallentin, 2011). For both
analyses, the significance threshold was set to p < 0.05, FWE
corrected formultiple comparisons. Functional images were over-
laid with the standard SPM8 single subject high resolution T1
image.
To constrain the analyses to specific, predefined anatomi-
cal sites (see section “Introduction” above) for which we had
hypotheses, we used a region of interest (ROI) approach. The
analyses were carried out as small volume corrections by masking
particular brain structures consistently found in neurocognitive
studies on social cognition. Masks were generated in the Wake
Forest University PickAtlas extension for SPM (Tzourio-Mazoyer
et al., 2002; Maldjian et al., 2003, 2004) as 10mm spheres cen-
tered in target peak voxels. These were reported as main findings
in recent studies on closely related topics all using stimuli very
compatible to ours (dynamic video stimuli displaying an actor
performing different types of actions). We recognize that a num-
ber of other areas have previously been reported as associated
to ToM and MNS, but we chose to restrict our self to a few
canonical areas of the right hemisphere which are among the
most consistently reported in the literature and that have been
associated with tasks resembling ours. The following masks were
employed: to test for neural activity related to ToM/mentalizing
we masked regions in mPFC [MNI (13, 37, 2)] and rTPJ [MNI
(49, −63, 29)] based on coordinates from Wurm et al. (2011).
To test for neural activity related to the mirror neuron system we
masked the right IFG [MNI (52, 32, 24)] and IPL [MNI (46, −48,
44)] based on coordinates from Ocampo et al. (2011). Finally,
to test for neural activity related to joint action/attention, we
masked right pSTS [MNI (48, −40 6,)], based on coordinates
from Redcay et al. (2010).
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Participants were generally able to solve the in-scanner recol-
lection task (“same actor/same object?”), and scored an average
response accuracy of 72% (SD = 5.33). One participant did not
perform significantly above chance due to a high number of
missed responses. However, since the participant did not self-
report concentration/sleepiness problems etc., and the exclusion
of the data did not affect the analysis substantially, the participant
was not excluded from the fMRI analysis.
The post-scanning rating of the socially engaging nature of
the stimulus videos showed a number of significant between-
condition differences and interactions. The main effect of osten-
sion yielded an F ratio of F(1, 19) = 203, p < 0.000, indi-
cating that the ostensive behavior of the actor made the
scenes overall more socially engaging (M = 3.05, SD = 0.77)
than non-ostensive scenes (M = 1.28, SD = 0.35). The main
effect of direction was also significant, F(1, 19) = 10.5, p < 0.01,
likewise indicating that direct perspective was found more
socially engaging (M = 2.69, SD = 0.44) than diverted perspec-
tive (M = 1.63, SD = 0.68). Finally, the main effect of action was
also found significant: F(1, 19) = 23.4, p < 0.000, indicating that
the more dynamic scenes including object manipulations (plac-
ing for/showing) were more socially engaging (M = 2.32, SD =
0.58), than non-dynamic scenes (M = 1.99, SD = 0.53). Besides,
all interactions were significant. Ostension interacted thus signif-
icantly with direction: F(1, 19) = 54.2, p < 0.000, indicating that
scenes were found more socially engaging when ostensive cues
were performed directly to the participant. Ostension interacted
significantly with action: F(1, 19) = 56.6, p < 0.000, suggesting
that the scenes were found more socially engaging when osten-
sion and action accompanied each other (to form communica-
tive gestures). Direction and action also interacted significantly,
although to a somewhat lesser extent: F(1, 19) = 7.2, p < 0.05,
and, finally, the factors showed a significant three-way interaction:
F(1, 19) = 10.1, p < 0.005 (see Figure 2).
STAND-ALONE EYE-TRACKING RESULTS
The analysis of participants’ eye-movements (saccade veloc-
ity) related to the conditions showed some significant effects.
The main effect of direction yielded an F ratio of F(1, 10) = 8,
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FIGURE 2 | Results from the post-scan stimulus ratings sorted by
condition. Notice that the graph summarizes the “within-subject” results
across all subjects and therefore we have not included error bars (between
subject variance would not reflect the actual analysis).
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p < 0.05, suggesting that participants generally displayed more
saccading behaviors in the diverted conditions (M = 0.31,
SD = 0.09) than in the direct (M = 0.29, SD = 0.08). The
main effect of action was also found significant: F(1, 10) = 19.2,
p < 0.005, indicating that participants made more saccades in
the action (M = 0.32, SD = 0.09) than the no-action conditions
(M = 0.29, SD = 0.08). The main effect of ostension and all
interaction effects were non-significant.
The analysis of pupil diameter changes also showed signifi-
cant effects. The main effect of ostension yielded an F ratio of
F(1, 10) = 5.2, p < 0.05, indicating pupil dilation (measured in
pixels) in response to ostensive cues (M = 78, SD = 10.7) rel-
ative to non-ostensive scenes (M = 77.7, SD = 10.6). Likewise,
the main effect of direction was found significant: F(1, 10) = 18.4,
p < 0.005, suggesting dilation in response to direct perspec-
tive (M = 78.4, SD = 10.8) relative to diverted perspective
(M = 77.3, SD = 10.5). The main effect of action had no effect
on pupil size and all interaction effects were non-significant
(see Figure 3).
fMRI RESULTS
As predicted, the positive main effect of ostension signif-
icantly modulated activity in regions associated with Joint
Action/Attention, i.e., the ROI in right pSTS [peak voxel: MNI
(48, −38, 0)]. However, no above threshold activations were
found in ROIs associated with ToM and MNS (i.e., mPFC, rTPJ,
rIFG, and rIPL) (see Figure 4A and Table 1). In contrast, the neg-
ative main effect of ostension was found significant in a number
of ROIs related both to ToM and MNS: mPFC [peak voxel: MNI
(6 42 0)], rIPL [MNI (54, −48, 38)], and rIFG [MNI (44, 36, 28)]
(see Figure 4B and Table 1). No significant effects were found in
the rTPJ and pSTS for this contrast.
The main effect of direction (both positive and negative) did
not modulate activity in any of the predefined ROIs. However,
explorative whole-brain analysis revealed activity in early visual
areas (V1) possibly related to participants’ increased eye move-
ments in this condition (see section “Stand-Alone Eye-Tracking
Results” above). These results will thus not be considered any
further.
The positive main effect of action elicited significant activity
in a number of ROIs relating to the MNS and Joint Action: right
pSTS [peak voxel: MNI (52, −48, 2)], rIPL [MNI (42, −44, 52)],
and rIFG [MNI (58, 30, 30)] (see Table 1). However, ROIs asso-
ciated with ToM (mPFC and rTJP) did not give significant
results. The negative main effect of action did not show any
effects. Likewise, none of the interaction effects showed signifi-
cant results.
Eye-movement corrected fMRI results
When factoring in parametric modulations expressing par-
ticipants’ relative eye-movements, activation patterns largely
resemble the results from the analysis above. This indicates
that the results reported in Table 1 are not confounded by
condition-related differences in participants’ eye-movement pat-
terns. However, the overall statistical strength is considerably
weaker, possibly due to the reduced number of participants enter-
ing this analysis (full data sets could only be obtained from 11
participants). The positive main effect of ostension was significant
in right pSTS [peak voxel: MNI (46, −40, 6)], but not in any of
the remaining ROIs. The negative main effect of ostension did not
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FIGURE 3 | Results of the pupillometric analysis. (A) Summarizes mean
pupil dilations in pixels for each of the four action conditions (we here omit
the no-action conditions to simplify the graph since that main effect of
action was not significant). Error bars express standard error of the mean.
(B) Shows averaged, baselined pupil dilation/constriction patterns for each of
the four action conditions over the time course of the 5 s stimulus videos.
Vertical gray bars putatively indicate the onset and duration of ostensive cues
and action.
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FIGURE 4 | Results of the fMRI ROI analysis for the ostensive
condition. Left column: brain maps depicting differential BOLD responses
evoked by ostension (+/−) in relevant ROIs. Right column: bar plot of peak
voxel contrast estimates for the positive and negative main effect of
ostension in each of the ROIs. Error bars express 90% confidence intervals.
(A) in the positive main effect of ostension, higher BOLD responses were
found in rpSTS, an area related to fine temporal integration and adaptation
(e.g., in the context of joint action). (B) in the negative main effect of
ostension, higher BOLD responses were found in rIFG and rIPL, areas often
associated with the mirror neuron system, and in the mPFC, often
associated with theory of mind/mentalizing. ∗p < 0.05 (FWE-corrected).
Table 1 | fMRI results (ROI analysis).
Putative anatomical regions Z -scores Coordinates
x y z
OSTENSION > NON-OSTENSION
pSTS (right) 4.61 48 −38 0
NON-OSTENSION > OSTENSION
IPL (right) 3.86 54 −48 38
IFG/MFG (right) 3.23 44 36 28
mPFC 2.99 6 42 0
ACTION > NON-ACTION
pSTS (right) 7.78 52 −48 2
IPL (right) 4.19 42 −44 52
IFG/MFG (right) 5.16 58 30 30
Main effects of experimental conditions (t-statistics) thresholded at p < 0.05
(FWE corrected for multiple comparisons).
Table 2 | Eye-movement corrected fMRI results (11 participants).
Putative anatomical regions Z -scores Coordinates
x y z
OSTENSION > NON-OSTENSION
rpSTS p < 0.000, corrected 4.36 46 −40 6
NON-OSTENSION > OSTENSION
rIPL p = 0.01, uncorrected 2.34 54 −48 48
mPFC p = 0.005, uncorrected 2.57 14 28 −2
ACTION > NON-ACTION
rpSTS p < 0.000, corrected 4.37 46 −42 6
rIPL p = 0.01 corrected 3.52 38 −44 48
rTPJ p = 0.01 corrected 3.53 50 −64 20
Main effects of experimental conditions (t-statistics).
give any above threshold activity. However, an exploratory low-
ering of significance thresholds revealed strong trends in mPFC
[MNI (14, 28, −2), p = 0.005, uncorrected] and rIPL [MNI
(54, −48, 48), p = 0.01, uncorrected] (see Table 2). No results
were found in pSTS, rTPJ and rIFG.
The main effect of action was found to significantly modulate
activity in right pSTS [MNI (46,−42, 6)], in rIPL [MNI (38, −44,
48)], and the rTPJ [MNI (50, −64, 20)] (see Table 2). No effects
were found in the remaining ROIs and for the negative main effect
of action. Likewise, none of the interaction effects reached above
threshold significance.
DISCUSSION
Which brain structures facilitate contingent complementary
coordination between interacting individuals? This study
attempts to make an experimental contribution to current
disputes concerning the foundations of social interaction.
Based on recent directions in philosophy of mind and complex
systems approaches we argue that social interaction may be
conceptualized as a collective, interpersonal phenomenon con-
stituted by multi-modal intersubjective coordination processes.
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This approach departs from ToM and MNS based frameworks,
where interaction is founded on or extrapolated from individual
processes of social observation, and it allows for specific predic-
tions regarding individual brain activity during social interaction.
Participants were presented with dynamic situations that
afforded different styles of social perception. In some situa-
tions, an actor “privately” manipulated objects in a non-ostensive
context, while in others object gestures were accompanied
with interaction-initiating, ostensive cues. Our results demon-
strate that the ostensive contextualization of action radically
altered the perceptual attitude of participants. While the non-
ostensive scenes called for an observational attitude concerned
with “understanding” the actions and intentions of the actor,
the ostensive act of placing an object for or showing an object
to someone strongly affords complementary completion by the
recipient. The non-ostensive and ostensive scenes thus engage
the participants in fundamentally different ways as “observational
bystanders” or as “potential interactive recipients.” While the
first type of situation (social observation) can be fully described
on the level of individual cognition (mental inference of sim-
ulation), the second (social interaction) is more appropriately
approached as a continuous adaptive coupling between minds
(Tylén and Allen, 2009; Hasson et al., 2012). We thus predicted
quite different behavioral and neurocognitive results for the two
conditions.
Participants’ ratings of the socially engaging character of stim-
ulus scenes confirm such predictions. Overall, the scores suggest
that although the video stimuli are inherently unresponsive (com-
pared to “live” interaction), they successfully evoked feelings of
social contingency in the participants. By far the strongest result
is obtained for the positive main effect of ostension, followed by
action. Curiously, and contrary to our expectations, the effect
of direction is substantially weaker, indicating that the recipient
design (“facing you” vs. “facing someone else”) is less impor-
tant for the participants’ experience of social engagement with
the displayed actor. However, there are strong interaction effects
indicating that direct perspective matters for the ostensive condi-
tions while the effect is substantially weaker for the non-ostensive
conditions (see Figure 2).
Analogous results are found for the fMRI brain imaging
data. Among the pre-defined regions of interest, the rpSTS was
most strongly activated by scenes affording social responsive-
ness. In these scenes, an actor looked up and made interaction-
initiating ostensive cues (eye contact, eyebrow flashes and nods).
The rpSTS area has been repeatedly associated with eye-gaze
(Allison et al., 2000; Pelphrey et al., 2004). In a related study,
Redcay et al. (2010) suggested that uncontrolled condition
related differences in participants’ eye-movement patterns could
potentially confound their findings. However, we employed in-
scanner eye-tracking to test for eye-movement related effects.
Analyses of saccade velocities did not show significant dif-
ferences for ostensive/non-ostensive conditions. Beside, when
participants’ eye-movements were factored into the fMRI anal-
ysis, results related to rpSTS were not influenced. Our findings
relating interactive conditions to activity in the pSTS can there-
fore not be explained simply by differences in participants’ eye
movements.
Other studies have indicated that rpSTS may be particularly
sensitive to gaze direction, such as the distinction between direct
and averted gaze (Kuzmanovic et al., 2009; Ethofer et al., 2011).
In our study, we modulated the body orientation of the actor, so
that she/he was either facing the participant or presented from
a slightly averted perspective. Contrary to our expectations, we
did not find any modulations of the rpSTS related to this contrast
(we had expected direction to interact with ostension). In fact,
similar to the behavioral stimulus ratings, the body orientation of
the actor showed relatively weak effects. In sum, the rpSTS effects
found in this study cannot be reduced to stimulus-induced dif-
ferences in participants’ eye-movement patterns or effects related
to the actors’ body and gaze directions. Instead, they suggest that
rpSTS activity may be related to a socially interactive contextual-
ization of the scene as a whole whether or not the participant was
addressed as the intended recipient of the act.
Interestingly, pupillometric analyses showed a strong main
effect of direction. When the actor was oriented toward the exper-
imental participant, we recorded stronger pupil dilations relative
to diverted orientations. Similar (although slightly weaker) effects
were found for ostension. Pupil dilation has been reported as a
reliable marker of low-level emotional arousal related to the sym-
pathetic nervous system (Laeng et al., 2012) and has likewise been
shown to provide a sensitive index of subtle and complex cogni-
tive and affective processes (Partala and Surakka, 2003; Granholm
and Steinhauer, 2004). The pupillometric findings in this study
are thus taken in support of our predictions: actors’ ostensive cues
and direct body orientation induce participants with increased
levels of attentional alertness due to affordances for comple-
mentary responsive action. It should be noted that although the
activation of rpSTS does not follow the same pattern as the pupil
dilations (rpSTS seems insensitive to direction), we cannot fully
exclude the possibility that arousal rather than complementary
interactive dynamics drives some of the brain activation patterns
in this study.
Together, the findings can inform discussion between differ-
ent models of social cognition. Whilemany “observational” social
cognition tasks rely solely on participants to internally represent
other agents’ behaviors, intentions and beliefs, social interaction
is more appropriately depicted as a continuous contingent cou-
pling between two or more individuals (Hasson et al., 2012).
Right pSTS has been reported in a number of studies contrasting
situations where participants solve tasks relying on continuous
coordination with external social stimuli with situations where
they solve tasks purely based on internal reasoning processes
(Iacoboni et al., 2001; Newman-Norlund et al., 2008; Noordzij
et al., 2009; Wyk et al., 2009; Redcay et al., 2010; Carter et al.,
2011). A subset of these studies (Newman-Norlund et al., 2008;
Noordzij et al., 2009; Redcay et al., 2010) even facilitated live
contingent interaction between experimental participants lying
in the scanner and cooperative partners in the control room in
cooperative tasks. It should be noted that—based solely on our
data—we cannot exclude the possibility that the rpSTS effect
found in our study reflects a mentalizing strategy. Following
the work of e.g., Gergely and colleagues (Csibra and Gergely,
2009; Southgate et al., 2009), ostensive cues can act to direct
and enhance attention to a subsequent behavior and thereby
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facilitate “understanding of the social goal” of the agent. However,
considering the growing literature associating the rpSTS with
contingent social interaction, we favor the interpretation that the
effect relates to the socially engaging affordances of the osten-
sive stimulus scenes evoking a strong inclination to respond in
complementary ways (Sartori et al., 2012).
Interestingly, when participants were confronted with non-
ostensive scenes featuring an actor “privately” manipulating
objects, we found increased activation of areas normally associ-
ated with ToM (mPFC) and MNS (rIPL and rIFG). We notice
that although the frontal component of our MNS mask was cen-
tered in the IFG (see section “Materials and Methods” above),
the activation peak found in our study is slightly more anterior
and thus rather resembles findings from Weissman et al. (2008)
relating social observation to the DLPFC. In contrast to the rIPL
activation, we will thus not make any strong claims about this
frontal component in relation to the MNS. However, our find-
ings suggest that the effects found in ToM and MNS related areas
could be explained by reference to the quite different affordances
of the control stimuli. The non-ostensive character of these scenes
frames the participant as an observing bystander making sense of
the scenes rather than responding to them. This form of “social
observation” does not to the same extent depend on fine temporal
coupling and coordination with the external social environment.
Rather, it can be characterized as a decoupled process relying on
inferential reasoning (mentalizing) andmental action simulation.
It has been argued that the MNS is indeed sensitive to
socially complementary action affordances (Newman-Norlund
et al., 2007). While an interesting TMS study could be interpreted
in favor of this account (Newman-Norlund et al., 2010), other
evidence is more mixed. We thus notice that in a study from
the same lab, the strongest effect of complementary actions was
seemingly found in the rpSTS (Newman-Norlund et al., 2008).
Furthermore, other researchers have not been able to replicate
the MNS findings for complementary actions (Kokal et al., 2009;
Ocampo et al., 2011).
The differential activation and deactivation patterns found
for interaction vs. observation conditions seem to resonate with
findings on intrinsic variability of macroscopic networks associ-
ated with attention and social-cognitive action control. Indeed,
evidence suggests that the neural apparatus supporting social
observation (in particular mPFC and IPL) are directly inhibited
by tasks requiring high cognitive demand and focused atten-
tion (Raichle et al., 2001; McKiernan et al., 2003; Spreng et al.,
2009; Allen and Williams, 2011). Similarly, the continuous track-
ing and contingent responding required of social interaction may
necessitate going “online” to the extent of actually de-activating
networks associated with ToM and self-related cognition (Fox
et al., 2005; Schilbach et al., 2008; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010).
We also found a number of our regions of interest to be
modulated by the positive main effect of action. In particular, sig-
nificant activation was found in rIFG, rIPL and the rpSTS, while
no effect was found in rTPJ and mPFC. While the activation of
MNS related regions (rIFG and rIPL) is possibly related to par-
ticipants’ mirroring of displayed actions, we speculate that the
ostensive properties of the object gestures themselves observed
in the behavioral study (stimulus ratings) might account for the
rpSTS component finding.
CONCLUSION
The current study contrasted brain activity elicited by short
videos, which evoked in the participants observational social
cognition and interactive social cognition. The difference was
triggered by the presence of ostensive cues, which open a channel
of communication and interaction. Observational social cogni-
tion differentially evoked activity in regions hitherto associated
with Theory of Mind (mPFC) and the Mirror Neuron Systems
(IPL, IFG). Interactive social cognition differentially evoked activ-
ity in right posterior STS, a region known to be involved in
continuous fine-grained temporal navigation and integration
of stimuli. Brain imaging findings are supported by behavioral
tests showing that participants found interactive conditions more
socially engaging and pupillometric analyses indicating higher
levels of arousal (pupil dilation) for interactive than observational
conditions.
Our findings demonstrate that very simple cues may shift
both the experience of participants and the brain activity associ-
ated with social cognition between an observational mode and an
interactive mode. The identification of a distinct interactive mode
of social cognition opens a new avenue for research on social cog-
nition, both under normal conditions and in clinical disorders,
such as autism and schizophrenia, characterized by disturbances
in social cognition.
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